Not everything is a red team

"Red team" has become the default label for almost any offensive security engagement. A two-week internal test of Active Directory gets sold as a red team, and so does a collaborative session with the blue team. The result is that buyers end up comparing quotes for very different work, or paying for something other than what they need. Sometimes the sales team pushes the wrong type of exercise, and the confusion only shows up once the mandate starts. By then, what the client expects and what they will actually get no longer line up, which is frustrating for everyone involved.

In this article, we separate the three engagement types we get asked about most: red team, assumed breach and purple team. For each one, we explain what it actually involves and which organizations get the most out of it.

Red Team vs Assumed Breach

Red team engagements

A red team engagement simulates a real adversary from start to finish. The team starts from the outside with no access, gets a foothold through phishing, exposed services, physical access or other initial access vectors, then works toward agreed objectives such as domain admin, a critical system or specific data. It is common to prepare a domain account ahead of time, kept in reserve in case the initial foothold does not succeed, so the rest of the engagement can still move forward. Stealth is part of the job: the point is to test whether your people, processes and tools detect and respond to an attack, not only whether vulnerabilities exist.

Only a few people on the client side know the test is happening, and engagements usually run several weeks to a few months. A red team fits organizations with a mature security program: a SOC or MDR provider, a working incident response process and a history of regular penetration testing. If your internal network has never been tested, a red team will mostly tell you what a cheaper engagement would have found faster.

Assumed breach engagements

An assumed breach engagement skips initial access. We start from a position an attacker would realistically reach, usually a standard domain user on a corporate workstation or a device on the internal network, and answer one question: how far can an attacker get from here? In practice, that means Active Directory and AD CS abuse, exposed credentials, lateral movement, privilege escalation and access to sensitive data.

It is also completely normal to ask for a dedicated assumed breach host where the tester has local admin rights, and where EDR and other security solutions are set to monitoring mode. This keeps the tester from spending days bypassing those tools on one machine and leaves more time for attack paths. Security solutions stay fully active on the rest of the network, so lateral movement is still tested against your real defenses.

Skipping initial access is a deliberate choice, not a shortcut. Phishing eventually works against every organization, so the time is better spent on what happens next. This engagement fits most organizations: those that have never tested their internal network, those coming out of an AD or cloud migration, and those preparing for a red team who want to close the obvious attack paths first.

Purple team engagements

A purple team engagement, which we internally also call a Detection Capability Assessment (DCA), is collaborative by design. Our offensive team runs attack techniques against your environment while your defenders follow along in real time. After each technique, both sides review what was logged, what triggered an alert and what went unnoticed, then tune detections and run it again.

The output is not just a list of findings but better detection coverage, often mapped to MITRE ATT&CK. A purple team fits organizations that have invested in a SOC, EDR or SIEM and want proof that it catches real attacks. It is also one of the best ways to train analysts on how attackers actually operate in an Active Directory environment.

Engagements criterias

How your pentesters behave in each engagement

The same team will work very differently depending on the engagement. In a red team, they move slowly and quietly: custom or modified tooling, activity spread over days, and avoiding anything noisy enough to trigger an alert. Communication goes through a small group on your side, and a finding may wait until the report if raising it early would give the test away.

In an assumed breach, speed and coverage come first. Testers use standard tooling such as BloodHound collection and AD CS enumeration, accept more noise, and try to map every viable attack path rather than just one. Check-ins are regular, and critical issues are reported as soon as they are found. In a purple team, nothing is hidden: each technique is announced, run, then paused while your defenders check their logs and alerts, and the same technique is often repeated with variations until it is detected.

In a purple team, nothing is hidden and the pentesters work side by side with your technical team, usually on a shared call. Before each technique, the tester explains what they are about to run and what it should look like in the logs. After it runs, both sides go through the EDR, SIEM and event logs together to see what was captured, what alerted and what was missed. Your analysts can ask questions, the tester can adjust the technique or repeat it with variations, and detections are tuned and retested on the spot. The goal is not to win, but to leave your team better equipped to catch the next real attack.

Which one is right for you ?

Start from your current maturity, not the name on the proposal. If your internal network and Active Directory have never been tested, start with an assumed breach. If you rely on a SOC, MDR or EDR but have no evidence it detects real attacks, a purple team will show you the gaps and help close them. If you have fixed past findings and tuned your detections, a red team is the right next step to test the whole chain under realistic conditions.

Many organizations go through all three over time: assumed breach to clean up attack paths, purple team to build detection, and red team to validate both. When you review a proposal, ask three questions: how is initial access handled, is stealth a goal, and are your defenders involved? The answers tell you which engagement you are actually buying.

At AprosSyber, we work closely with each client before a mandate starts to understand their environment, their security maturity and what they want to learn. That way, we propose the engagement that fits, not the one with the most impressive name, and everyone knows what to expect from day one.